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After the latest failure(s) of negotiations on agricultural trade at the WTO in December 
2009, of the FAO summit in Rome on food security in November 2009, and of the 
Copenhagen climate change conference in December 2009, what conclusions can we 
draw from these successive failures and what questions do they lead us to ask in the 
implementation of the Lascaux program? 
At the crossroad of these three negotiations, there is the problem of farmers' access to 
productive land and the access for all individuals to a healthy and sufficient food. This is 
partly an issue concerning the ineffectiveness of economical and social human rights. 
During the 4th World Forum on Human Rights (held in Nantes on 28 and 29 June 2010), 
we will query this ineffectiveness, its causes and the legal remedies to fix it. This task is 
difficult but necessary. This will be a major "roadmap" of the Lascaux program: 
understanding followed by suggestion... 
The principles that govern trade in the WTO severely limit the possibility for States to 
treat differently competing products based on their environmental costs. Therefore, 
under the rules of international trade, it would be very difficult for a State to enforce, at 
its borders, a carbon tax on imports of products whose production has resulted in more 
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GHG emissions than national competing products. If we wanted to achieve this, we 
should pursue simultaneously, and not separately, the trade and environment 
negotiations. 
Moreover, the WTO negotiations on agriculture stumble on the openness level of 
developing countries to products from rich countries. This is the counterpart for the 
dismantling of subsidies in the latter – especially in Europe and USA. The prospect of 
food crises in southern countries imposes to limit trade liberalization on their territory. 
For that reason, the trade negotiation provides the opportunity for each State to 
implement a safeguard mechanism allowing it to increase its customs tariffs in case of 
increased imports of agricultural products on its internal market. Each State should thus 
be able to restrict imports of agricultural commodities that compete with domestic 
production. Nevertheless, there is still a significant disagreement regarding the 
threshold to launch this safeguard mechanism. But this threshold depends on the trade 
negotiations in the WTO as well as the negotiations on food security in the FAO. 
This close and necessary link between negotiations – that are conducted separately – 
probably explains in part their failure or, at least, increases difficulties to reach their 
success. It would be required that the organizers of the various negotiations coordinate 
their actions, draw together the arguments of possible compromise by linking together 
the benefits from one of them to counterparties which may come from another. 
Thus, the three linked negotiations must necessarily be jointly analyzed. Then, under the 
implementation of the right to land and food, there is a double synergy between the 
trade negotiations in the WTO on one side and those on global warming and food 
security on another side. 
This opens, for the Lascaux program, two research directions. 
The first direction will analyze the tangle of negotiations and the common reason for 
failure. These negotiations bind together the fate of an economic issue – the 
development of trade and international trade, an environmental issue – that of global 
warming, and a social issue – that of poverty related to food crises. These three issues 
are precisely those that make up the concept of sustainable development. So how can 
we link the three economic, environmental and social issues in the search for 
compromise covering the various negotiations? And what legal forms might give them a 
compulsory binding force? 
The second direction leads to analyze the concepts implemented in the common field of 
economic, environmental and social negotiations. These concepts will not have the same 
legal and political office as they will serve the expanding law of market or its regulation. 
To some, the food trade liberalization can only benefit the richest countries, as it is 
always the case in other sectors subject to law of market. It should rather to limit the 
expansion of the law of market by a legally binding regulation. 
For others, all solutions must involve greater trade liberalization. The liberalization of 
trade in environmental goods and services would be expected to have a positive effect 
on global warming. And liberalization of trade in agricultural products is expected to be 
conducive to development – and thus help reduce the prospect of food crises. 
That liberalization is a cause of problems, or their solution instead, it is necessary to 
analyze concepts able to establish legal principles especially those of sovereign land, 
food security and food specificity: 
 The sovereignty of land determines the means by which states can maintain 
control of agricultural land – in particular to prevent its capture by foreign private or 
public powers. This form of sovereignty is thus intended to be in opposition to a new 
form of colonization that is confined to the rich lands of poor areas i.e. what this 
earth contains (rare metals, oil ...) or what it can produce (food, biofuels ...). Such 
sovereignty is thus directly resulting from the territorial sovereignty of the state and 
legitimized by it. In this context we must examine the legal ways of access to 
productive land for farmers, by browsing patterns of ownership (acquisition), of 
provision (lease, loan ...), of allocation of land to agricultural use (public- or collective 
control of use) and of water supply (collectivization, water collection,). The land law 
is based and built on the legal concept of property. The property can be understood 
as an almost absolute monopoly to the private owner, as a public good where the 
land belongs to the State or as a collective good if the land is a customary ownership. 
In reality, the central question is whether land should - or should not – be considered 
as a simple commodity since it is quantitatively non-extensible and its use should be 
shared between a more and more growing number of people. In many parts of the 
world, this issue is still unresolved and it oscillated between customary and a 
modern land law. What land law to choose and what conception of property to 
retain if one wants simultaneously: - secure farmers' access to productive land, - 
develop agriculture to feed the population, - ensure legal stability for those who 
exploit the land? 
 Food security allows states to provide at once an adequate supply of food for the 
whole population and the food safety. Food security necessarily presupposes that the 
state retains some degree of control over agricultural products entering or leaving its 
territory. This is expressed through food sovereignty, which determines how the 
state can define public policies to ensure adequate access of population to a safe and 
healthy food, taking into account the requirements and principles of international 
law. Food security also requires the State to enforce in its territory, a food public 
order (and / or humanitarian) to ensure the quantity and quality of food destined for 
the population. But it is not easy to determine the nature of this public order 
(management order or protection order, it characterizes an assumed degree of 
protectionism) and its reach across borders (in particular ensured by the 
mechanisms of private international law and limited by international trade law). Can 
we reconcile a national imperative of food security with the international trade, and 
by what legal ways? 
 The food specificity can pose a fundamental question: Does trade in agricultural 
products (because they are vital for people) must be covered by a special legal 
treatment? Overall, these products are now regarded rather as a commodity like 
others. Their trade is an ordinary trade, as is also the trade of agricultural land in 
many countries. But the least we can say is that this view of trade has not stemmed 
the tide of poverty and famine in southern countries. There is a need to consider a 
correction of the general Law to implement a special law for agricultural goods. 
The food specificity may already occur at the stage of intellectual property (broadly 
defined), - including tailoring patent law applied to seeds, - specifying the plant 
variety protection law applied to agricultural products, - expanding internationally 
legal ways to promote products. The food specificity could also affect the 
mechanisms of price formation in order to remove at least the basic food products 
on the evils of speculation. We forget too quickly that speculation only concerns 
successive increases and decreases of prices. Price stability suppresses any 
speculative attempt. Therefore, speculation on commodities (whose populations, 
especially in southern countries, eat to live or survive) certainly leads to instability 
and volatility of prices and, consequently, to successive and inevitable food crises. 
This specificity could also involve the mechanisms of competition, especially when 
it is necessary to limit exports of a product in the name of security of supply, or to 
restrict imports on behalf of the survival of domestic producers. 
If the agricultural products were subject to specific legal regulation, this would probably 
be a step in the direction of effective human rights to land and food. This is the way the 
Lascaux program tries to explore, which will track "from land to food and from values to 
rules" with the next stage at Forum Lascaux held in Nantes on 28 and 29 June 2010. 
